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Broadcasting the 2006 World Cup:  
The Right of Arab Fans versus  
ART Exclusivity 
Bashar H. Malkawi* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The World Cup is the world’s largest sporting event.  
Organized by the Federation Internationale de Football Association 
(FIFA),1 the 2006 World Cup, held in Germany, was televised in 
approximately 189 countries to nearly 5 billion people.2  In Arab 
countries, the 2006 World Cup may be remembered more for its 
off-field legal battles than its on-field action. 
The 2006 World Cup found itself at the center of Arab 
countries’ attention.  In the past fans enjoyed free access to the 
televised World Cup on public channels that maintain public 
 
* Bashar H. Malkawi is Assistant Professor of Commercial Law at the Hashemite 
University, Jordan.  He holds an S.J.D. in International Trade Law from the American 
University, Washington College of Law, and an LL.M. in International Trade law from 
the University of Arizona.  The author would like to express his immense gratitude to 
Professor Daniel Gervais for his guidance and advice. 
 1 In 1904, the national soccer associations of France, Belgium, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland established FIFA to promote the game of 
Association Football (soccer), to foster friendly relations among the National 
Associations, Confederations, and their officials and players by promoting the 
organization of soccer at all levels, and to control every type of soccer by taking steps as 
shall be deemed necessary or advisable.  Since its establishment, FIFA has grown from 
seven members to 177 members into one of the most prestigious sports organizations in 
the world. See generally FIFA.com, History of FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/en/history/ 
history/0,1283,4,00.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2007). 
 2 See The Odd Man Out, ECONOMIST, June 10, 2006. 
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service obligations.3  However, Arab Radio & Television (ART), a 
commercial broadcaster, bought the telecast rights to the World 
Cup matches in Arab countries.  As a result of this deal, fans in 
Arab countries were not able to conveniently watch the World Cup 
broadcast.  Further, the legal significance of the ART exclusive 
rights deal is not yet fully appreciated in Arab countries. 
Part I of this article will first provide background on the ART 
deal in its relation to the World Cup.  Part II will discuss the 
economics of exclusivity, and the likely social effects on Arab 
fans.  Because broadcasting is related to copyright law, Part III of 
this article will provide an overview of the attempts made by Arab 
countries to improve copyright protection.  Additionally, this 
section will discuss how ART’s exclusive rights will be analyzed 
under the existing copyright laws of Arab countries.  Part IV will 
investigate the antitrust implications of ART’s exclusive rights.  
Finally, Part V will provide some solutions to the issue of ART’s 
exclusivity that attempt to balance the right of Arab fans and the 
development of a diverse broadcasting industry in Arab countries. 
This article concludes that given current trends regarding World 
Cup broadcasting in Arab countries, legislative or regulatory action 
should be taken to guarantee that World Cup matches are available 
to all Arab fans regardless of their ability to gain access to or 
afford pay television.  In sum, Arab fans should come first. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In-home television viewing is the most popular activity for 
male and female Arabs.4  Radio and television have made soccer 
the most popular game in Arab countries.  Television brought the 
 
 3 See Bernd Holznagel, The Mission of Public Service Broadcasters, 5 INT’L J. COMM. 
L. & POL’Y 1 (2000), for a discussion of public service broadcasters implementing their 
cultural mission and guiding role. 
 4 See generally The World through Their Eyes—Arab Satellite Television, ECONOMIST, 
Feb. 26, 2005. Across the Arab world, the impact of the satellite dish has been profound. 
Id.  Al-Jazeera, by far the best known among some 150 Arab satellite channels, boasts 40 
million to 50 million regular followers. Id.  The entertainment channel MBC has even 
more. Id.  When their smaller rival, Beirut-based Future TV ran a song contest last 
summer, 15 million viewers voted on the outcome—more Arabs than have ever cast 
ballots in a free election. Id. 
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game into the hearts and homes of millions of citizens across the 
Arab region, enhancing its appeal several-fold.  People who had no 
interest in the game earlier have now become hardcore fans.  All 
this is a result of the radio and television broadcasts. 
There is also a social purpose for the World Cup.  In essence, 
this is best expressed by the way it inspires young people to take 
up soccer, to develop their personalities, to face the challenges of 
life, and to experience the joys and good fellowship that should be 
at the heart of soccer.5  Televised sports in Arab countries may be 
explained as a form of social cohesion, a cultural festival that had 
the effect of developing harmony, which large quantities of people 
share.  Televised sports still provide an overarching framework 
that suggests stability and some degree of unity in shared national 
values. 
Typically, to broadcast the World Cup, a three-way deal is 
arranged between the organizer, host broadcaster, and other 
broadcasters.  FIFA initially owns the broadcasting rights to the 
World Cup.  FIFA usually admits only one host broadcaster (i.e., 
the broadcaster in the country where the World Cup takes place) to 
produce the television signal.6  In this manner, FIFA controls the 
broadcasting of the World Cup and guarantees exclusivity.  The 
host broadcaster then must secure broadcast rights from FIFA to 
televise the World Cup within its own national territory.7  Other 
broadcasters typically try to secure similar rights to broadcast the 
World Cup within their respective national territories.  They do so 
from the host broadcaster, either in the form of a license to exploit 
the material produced by the host broadcaster or an assignment of 
all rights. 
ART had a number of investment opportunities available to it.  
The first and most common investment approach was to acquire an 
 
 5 See STEPHEN DOBSON & JOHN GODDARD, THE ECONOMICS OF FOOTBALL 318 
(Cambridge University Press 2001). 
 6 It is up to the event organizer whether or not to grant satellite broadcasting rights to a 
given broadcaster, in full knowledge of the economic impact that this may have on 
possible exploitation of terrestrial broadcasting rights by other broadcasters in countries 
situated in the footprint of the satellite. 
 7 See Coopers & Lybrand, The Impact of European Union Activities on Sport, 17 LOY. 
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 245, 285 (1995). 
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interest in the World Cup through broadcast rights.  Accordingly, 
ART, a pay television distributor, was granted, by the host 
broadcaster (a German production company), the exclusive right to 
live coverage of the World Cup matches in the Middle East.  The 
price for television rights to the World Cup was high.8  The 
broadcast fees may skyrocket in the future. 
As part of the deal, ART and its sponsors will air their 
commercials during pre-game, half-time, and post-game segments; 
and, ART will have its logo superimposed on the screen during the 
telecasts.  National broadcasters in Arab countries were only 
permitted to broadcast twenty-minute highlight programs for 
soccer matches and were required to delay any other coverage for 
several hours after the conclusion of a soccer match.9  However, 
the highlights or short reporting would do little to satisfy most 
soccer fans in Arab countries that wish to experience the entire 
event.  There is a difference between live and recorded coverage, 
and between full coverage and excerpts.  Arab fans have reportedly 
been infuriated by ART’s deal.10 
II. THE EFFECTS OF EXCLUSIVITY 
Compared with the United States and the European Union, pay 
television was only recently introduced in Arab countries.11  In the 
past, once a broadcast was made, there was a free exchange of 
sound and television broadcasts throughout Arab countries.  Those 
policies sought to increase the diversity of programming. 
 
 8 The ART network paid $100 million for the right to broadcast the World Cup in 
2006, 2010 and 2014. Telephone Interview with Khaled Slaubi, Senior Marketing 
Manager, ART, in Jordan’s Media City (Aug. 5, 2006). 
 9 Broadcasts of the highlight programs occur on tape delay at 11:30 p.m. Id. 
 10 Iraq’s public broadcaster has no retransmission rights for the matches and the cost of 
subscriptions to satellite broadcasters are the beyond the means of many. See Khalil Jalil, 
ART Spoils World Cup Celebrations in Iraq, MIDDLE EAST ONLINE, June 6, 2006, 
http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=16651. 
 11 Pay television includes over-the-air or satellite subscription television and cable 
subscription television, both pay-per-view and premium channels. See Carles Llorens-
Maluquer, European Responses to Bottlenecks in Digital Pay-TV: Impacts on Pluralism 
and Competition Policy, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 557, 559 (1998). 
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There are many social equity issues with regard to the 
broadcast of the 2006 World Cup in Arab countries.  The 2006 
World Cup broadcasts, therefore, had more than economic 
concerns with the broadcast production. 
A. Economics of Exclusivity 
In the past, FIFA concerned itself mainly with ensuring 
coverage to attract sponsorship and promoting the popularity of 
soccer.  However, exclusive broadcasting had economic 
advantages to the organizer of the World Cup, FIFA. In recent 
years, FIFA has come to resemble a commercial organization.  It is 
part of a process of sport commodification in which sponsorship 
advertising and media coverage dominate.  FIFA should be able to 
resist offers of higher money. 12  Wide access should be the goal of 
FIFA.  FIFA should follow the examples of other sport bodies such 
as the International Olympic Committee, which accepted 
substantially less money for wider access.13 
Exclusivity of broadcasting also gave economic advantages to 
the purchaser of the rights, ART, and the host broadcaster, the 
German production company.  In contrast to free-to-air television, 
pay television earns revenue primarily through the sale of 
subscriptions and particular features.14  This revenue is 
supplemented with some advertising. 
 
 12 See James A. R. Nafziger, International Sports Law: A Replay of Characteristics and 
Trends, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 489, 499 (1992) (discussing the lack of ability on the part 
sports bodies to resist commercial pressures); see also Lindsay J. Rosenthal, From 
Regulating Organization to Multi-Billion Dollar Business: The NCAA is 
Commercializing the Amateur Competition it has Taken Almost a Century to Create, 13 
SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 321, 329 (2003). 
 13 In 1995, the International Olympic Committee granted the broadcast rights to the 
2000, 2004 and 2008 Olympic Games to the European Broadcasting Union, a union of 
predominantly public free-to-air broadcasters, over a much higher offer from Sky Sports. 
See Scott Bouvier, The Broadcasting Bill and Comparative Medial Law, 5 CARDOZO J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 507, 532 n.91 (1997). 
 14 With private free-to-air television, the owner earns revenue primarily through the 
sale of advertising. Public free-to-air television is usually funded by the Government but 
may also accept funding by advertising. See Garrett Levin, Buggy Whips and Broadcast 
Flags: The Need for a New Politics of Expression, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 24 
(2005). 
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Exclusive broadcasting can be disadvantageous in Arab 
countries for several reasons.  First, the pay television market in 
Arab countries is immature.  The Arab market lacks a greater 
degree of non-exclusivity in the sale of broadcasting rights.  In 
other words, there is limited competition between pay televisions 
in Arab countries.  On the other hand, the U.S. has more flexibility 
so that, for example, ESPN and FOX all cover parts of the 
professional baseball season.15  Second, shifting broadcasting of 
the World Cup from Arab public free-to-air television to pay 
television will substantially affect public free-to-air television 
viability or, at the very least, program quality.  Third, due to high 
subscription fees, pay television in Arab countries would not be 
able to gain a critical mass to fulfill their objectives for more 
diverse and innovative programming. 
B. Social Consequences of Exclusivity 
The ART exclusive broadcasting arrangement was 
disadvantageous to Arab viewers, particularly where rights are 
acquired by ART, a satellite-TV company whose signal is 
receivable by only a small proportion of viewers who paid a hefty 
fee to receive that signal or use special equipment.16  Many 
viewers were very upset because the World Cup coverage was 
shifted exclusively to pay television.  For example, opinion polls 
found that eight out of ten people in Jordan believed that the World 
Cup matches should be available to the widest audience.17 
 
 15 See Jeff Friedman, The Impact of Major League Baseball’s Local Television 
Contracts, 10 SPORTS LAW. J. 1, 12–13 (2003).  In the U.S., the word “soccer” is used to 
refer to “football” as known in the rest of the world. The word “football” in the U.S. 
means American football.  Soccer still remains a distant also-ran behind American sports 
such as baseball, basketball, hockey and American football.  In 2002 only 3.9 million 
Americans watched the World Cup final, compared with 95 million who watched the 
Super Bowl. America’s coolness towards soccer is another example of American 
exceptionalism. See ANDREI S. MARKOVITS & STEVEN L. HELLERMAN, OFFSIDE: SOCCER 
AND AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 55 (Princeton University Press, California 2001).  As 
this article is for a U.S. journal, I use the term “soccer.” 
 16 See Mohammad Ghazal, Football Fans Cannot Afford Prohibitive Premium Channel 
Prices, JORDAN TIMES, June 14, 2006 (an annual subscription to the ART network is 
JD235 ($331); the minimum wage in Jordan is set at JD115, the equivalent of $162). 
 17 See Zuhair Al-Shaqairy, Exclusivity of Broadcasting Dispossesses the World Cup 
Shine, AL-RAI NEWSPAPER, July 15, 2006, at 31. 
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Many Arab soccer fans across countries like Jordan, Kuwait, 
Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco believe that they have a right to 
watch the World Cup for “free” on television.18  Arab viewers 
should be entitled to watch the World Cup matches live.  Indeed, 
the entitlement to watch live matches should be a fundamental 
right.  However, no Arab country has gone so far as to grant 
viewers an enforceable right to hear or watch a particular soccer 
program.  Nonetheless, consumers in Arab countries may raise 
claims based on such rights.  Many constitutions in Arab countries 
include freedom of speech or opinion that can guarantee the rights 
of viewers to view World Cup matches.19 
ART may increase the amount of soccer and other sports 
available on television, including sports not previously 
broadcasted.20  In this way, ART will delight those viewers in Arab 
countries who can afford access to its network.  However, ART 
also will bring a countervailing audience disempowerment when 
the universal free service of soccer television becomes the preserve 
of the affluent few.  In other words, the socially disadvantaged are 
excluded from the World Cup spectacle by their lack of command 
of the necessary income for the installation and maintenance of the 
ART system.  The three million ART subscribers are thus able to 
preempt the other 296 million television homes in Arab countries.  
Therefore, an image of “inequity” emerges in the Arab society. 
 
 18 See John Mathews, Rip-off blocks kick-off . . . stingy purse begs a tin cup; 11m too 
high, ARAB TIMES, June 15, 2006, available at http://www.arabtimesonline.com/ 
arabtimes/kuwait/Viewdet.asp?ID=8194&cat=a (soccer fans in many Arab countries are 
disappointed that they cannot watch the World Cup, an event that happens every four 
years). 
 19 See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN, ch. 2, art. 15.1 
(1952), TUNISIA CONSTITUTION, art. 8.1 (1959 as amended on July 12, 1988), BAHRAIN 
CONSTITUTION, art. 23 (2002), and QATAR CONSTITUTION, art. 47 (2003). See also Jim 
Phipps et al., Middle Eastern Law, 40.2 INT’L LAW. 597, 605 (2006) (discussing the Iraqi 
constitution and its protection of freedom of opinion). 
 20 This rhetoric is usually used by pay televisions. See Michael Shapiro, International 
Media Law in the 90s and Beyond: Expanding into the International Marketplace, 
17 WHITTIER L. REV. 307, 309–10 (1995). 
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Arab countries suffer from many economic problems such as 
poverty and unemployment.21  The World Cup was a golden 
opportunity for Arab audiences to set aside their daily problems, 
even for a while.  However, ART’s exclusive broadcasting added 
to their misery. 
There have been serious public relations consequences for 
ART.  It has been portrayed as a grasping gold-digger with little 
regard for those unable or unwilling to purchase highly expensive 
satellite receivers and smart cards.  In sum, ART is a business 
organization whose only intention is to make as large a profit as 
can be made by telecasting the World Cup matches exclusively, 
resulting in a loss of welfare to Arab societies. 
In addition to the goal of accumulating profits, ART should 
have considered equity grounds.  The right to access the World 
Cup matches, particularly by those with restricted incomes, must 
be protected.  The Arab general public should not be 
disadvantaged by the loss of access to the World Cup matches, 
which are recognized to play a significant part in their lives. 
III. THE ROLE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 
In the past, Arab countries lacked or had ineffective intellectual 
property laws.22 Intellectual Property was not nearly as important 
in the Arab society as it is today.  Arab copyright laws were not 
harmonized with world standards until the Berne and the Rome 
Conventions.23  Moreover, as Arab countries acceded to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), they had to enact copyright laws 
 
 21 See John H. Donboli & Farnaz Kashefi, Doing Business in the Middle East: A 
Primer for U.S. Companies, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 413, 445–48 (2005) (unemployment 
level reached 15%). 
 22 See Amir H. Khoury, The Development of Modern Trademark Legislation and 
Protection in Arab Countries of the Middle East, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 249, 2251–52 
(2003) (analyzing the trademark laws of Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt). 
 23 See Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, last 
revised, Paris, July 24, 1971, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (Berne 
Convention), available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html; 
International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 44 (Rome Convention), 
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/rome/trtdocs_wo024.html. 
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which comply with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs).24 
The TRIPs Agreement was a major step toward establishing a 
more effective system of intellectual property disciplines and 
procedures.25  The TRIPs Agreement addresses trademarks, 
industrial designs, patents, and protection of undisclosed 
information.26  The TRIPs Agreement also contains copyright 
provisions, which provide various neighboring rights to 
broadcasting organizations.  Broadcasting organizations are 
“accorded the right to prohibit unauthorized fixations, 
reproductions of fixations, ‘and the rebroadcasting by wireless 
means of broadcasts, as well as the communication to the public of 
television broadcasts of the same.’”27  As technology advances, the 
TRIPs Agreement could be extended to cover broadcasting via 
alternative media such as mobile phones.28 
World Cup matches themselves are not works of authorship 
that can be copyright-protected under the copyright laws of Arab 
countries.  The nonexclusive list of categories of works eligible for 
copyright protection does not include any category that includes 
World Cup matches.29  However, while the matches themselves are 
 
 24 See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S., Jordan Hold Talks in Effort to Avoid Sanctions Over IP 
Protection, 15 INT’L TRADE REP. 661 (Apr. 15, 1998) (describing discussions of whether 
Jordan should be targeted with trade sanctions under the Special 301 provision of the 
1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act for failing to protect U.S. patents, 
copyrights, and trademarks); Gary G. Yerkey & Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Wants more 
Progress on IPR before Allowing Jordan to Join WTO, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. 866 (May 
19, 1999).  See also Gary G. Yerkey, United States Close to Sealing Tariff Deal with 
Saudi Arabia in WTO Accession Talks, 22 INT’L TRADE REP. 709 (Apr. 28, 2005) 
(discussing issues, notably in the areas of services and intellectual property protection, to 
be resolved before Saudi accession to the WTO). 
 25 See David Nimmer, GATT’s Entertainment: Before and After NAFTA, 15 LOY. L.A. 
ENT. L. REV. 133, 142 (1995). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 150. 
 28 See Matthew D. Asbell, Progress on the WIPO Broadcasting and Webcasting 
Treaty, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 349, 351 (2006) (broadcasting is broader today 
than before as signals can be uploaded or otherwise redistributed most often via the 
internet). 
 29 See, e.g., Jordan Provisional Copyright Law No. 52, art. 3 (2001), Official Gazette 
No. 4508 (Oct. 1, 2001), available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/pdf/en/jo/ 
jo004en.pdf. 
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not copyrightable, copyright laws in Arab countries consider the 
actual television broadcasts of the World Cup matches 
copyrightable works of authorship.30  Thus, any effort by ART to 
claim exclusive intellectual property rights for the World Cup must 
be based on the television broadcasts of the matches. 
Television networks and other broadcasters in the past did not 
have standing under past Arab copyright laws.  TRIPs required 
Arab countries to enact copyright laws that comport with the 
TRIPs Agreement.  Now, broadcasters will have more legal 
certainty when they acquire rights to a satellite broadcast.  Under 
the new copyright regime in Arab countries, broadcasting 
organizations have a non-waivable right to prohibit rebroadcasting 
by wireless means and the communication of the broadcast to the 
public through public television.31  Thus, copyright laws in Arab 
countries extend protection to the communication of materials by 
satellite and cable. 
It should be noted that copyright laws in Arab countries permit 
a defense of fair dealing for the purpose of reporting current events 
or news.32  In the case involving World Cup broadcasts, ART 
permitted Arab public television stations to broadcast a twenty-
minute segment of highlights from the soccer matches.  Thus, ART 
can sue the Arab public television stations for breach of copyright 
in the ART’s World Cup transmissions if the stations showed more 
than twenty minutes of a match during their sports news programs.  
However, Arab national television stations can rely on the fair 
dealing defense, which exists to balance exclusive rights in 
 
 30 See id. art. 23; Copyright Law, Royal Decree No: M/41, art. 9.1, 2nd Rajab 1424 H 
(Aug. 30, 2003) (Saudi Arabia), available at http://www.sagia.gov.sa/Downloads/ 
Copyright%20Law.pdf; Arab Republic of Syria Law No. 12/2001, art. 13 (Feb. 27, 
2001), available at http://portal.unesco.org/culture/admin/file_download.php/sy_ 
copyright_2001_en.pdf?URL_ID=30397&filename=11424371293sy_copyright_2001_en
.pdf&filetype=application%2Fpdf&filesize=68822&name=sy_copyright_2001_en.pdf&l
ocation=user-S/ (also available at http://www.internet-law.ru/law/int/nation_unesco/ 
syrian/syrian.pdf); Federal Law No. (7) of 2002 Concerning Copyrights and Neighboring 
Rights, art. 19 (2002) (UAE), available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/pdf/en/ae/ 
ae001en.pdf. 
 31 See Jordan Provisional Copyright Law no. 52, supra note 29. 
 32 See id., art. 17; see also Federal Law No. (7) of 2002 Concerning Copyrights and 
Neighboring Rights, supra note 30, art. 3. 
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copyright and the interest of the public in comprehensive 
information. 
To mitigate the monopolistic broadcasting of World Cup 
matches, a compulsory licensing scheme should be considered.33  
However, only two compulsory licensing provisions currently exist 
in the copyright laws of Arab countries.  These two provisions 
include translation of foreign works and publication of certain 
works.34  Arab countries should modify their copyright laws to 
include a compulsory license law for the public showing of World 
Cup telecasts.  A compulsory license law would compel ART to 
license its broadcasting at a rate that is reasonable as determined 
by governments. 
World Cup broadcasts in Arab countries were encrypted to 
prevent ART rights overspill, reception of the broadcast outside 
those intended subscribers and without a copyright license for the 
unintended viewers.  Since many viewers in Arab countries were at 
a disadvantage, they attempted to violate copyright protection by 
intercepting and decoding channels’ signals in order to watch the 
World Cup.35  Certainly, ART’s exclusivity and its high fees will 
not help promote a culture of respect for copyright protection in 
Arab countries.36  Therefore, because ART’s exclusivity was based 
 
 33 The participants in TRIPs collectively agree that some licensing practices or 
conditions pertaining to intellectual property rights which may restrain competition may 
have adverse effects.  Accordingly, members may adopt appropriate measures, consistent 
with the other provisions of TRIPs to prevent or control such anti-competitive practices. 
See Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Marrakesh, Uru., Apr. 15, 1994, The Final 
Act of the 1986–1994 Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 40.1, 8.2. 
 34 See Jordan Provisional Copyright Law, supra note 29, art. 11. See also United Arab 
Emirates Federal Law, supra note 30, art. 21. 
 35 For example, the UAE was bombarded by black market TV smart cards and satellite 
receiver boxes as viewers looked for ways to avoid paying for expensive ART 
subscriptions.  The smart cards gave access to all 18 ART channels, including eight set 
aside for the World Cup.  The smart cards cost dhs550 ($149). See The World Cup for 
DHS 550, http://www.7days.ae/2006/06/04/the-world-cup-for-dhs-500.html (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2007). 
 36 See John Carroll, Intellectual Property Rights in the Middle East: A Cultural 
Perspective, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 555, 558, 574 (2001) 
(arguing that there are political and cultural factors that hamper effective enforcement of 
intellectual property laws in the Middle East and that there is a sentiment for many 
Middle Easterners that religiously based laws are necessary barracks against 
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on paid access for those who can afford it, there are repercussions 
on the broader picture of intellectual property protection and 
enforcement in Arab countries. 
IV. ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF ART TELEVISING THE WORLD CUP 
The TRIPs Agreement reserves the rights of countries to adopt 
and enforce antitrust law.  TRIPs recognizes that intellectual 
property, and particularly intellectual property licensing, can be 
used in abusive ways, and some of those ways may harm 
competition.37  Accordingly, Arab countries are allowed to adopt 
antitrust laws to prevent harm to themselves in their internal 
markets. 
Antitrust law is concerned with protecting against economic 
oppression and unfairness.38  ART has made antitrust issues more 
important in Arab countries.  The dispositive question is whether 
giving ART exclusive right to televise the World Cup comes under 
antitrust law.  There is no formal antitrust ruling in Arab countries 
on the issue yet as no legal challenge has been mounted against 
ART telecast rights.  However, ART’s exclusivity is not natural 
and in itself infringes antitrust law due to its long period and other 
excessive effects. 
The effect of ART’s exclusivity and whether it is contrary to 
antitrust law depends on a number of factors.  These factors may 
include: the duration of the exclusivity agreement, the importance 
of the World Cup in relative and absolute terms, how many Arab 
viewers want to watch the World Cup, whether any other soccer 
events are substitutable, how important the World Cup is to 
advertisers, and whether ART has acquired exclusive rights to 
 
Westernization and the domination of Western culture).  Middle Easterners believe that 
violating intellectual property rights is the way to get revenge on the West for 
colonialism. Id. 
 37 The TRIPs Agreement provides that nothing shall prevent members from specifying 
prohibited practices that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual 
property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market. See 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 33, art. 
40.3. 
 38 See generally William H. Page, Ideological Conflict and the Origins of Antitrust 
Policy, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1991) (examination of the competing views of antitrust law). 
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broadcast many other important soccer events.39  Another antitrust 
issue is sublicensing by ART who had exclusive rights to broadcast 
the World Cup in Arab countries.  ART refused sublicensing to 
Arab public television stations.  ART demanded royalties that were 
too high and that discriminated between Arab public television 
stations—acts that would be contrary to antitrust law.40  However, 
whether abuse happened is a question of fact for Arab national 
courts to decide. 
ART’s antitrust problems arise when it is the dominant 
company in the country.  Unlike in the United States, antitrust laws 
in Arab countries prohibit exploitative abuses of dominant market 
power.41  Moreover, Arab antitrust laws do not create an 
exemption for pay television broadcasts of soccer events.42  After 
acquiring broadcasting rights, ART acquired content, thus 
strengthening its market position.  Concentration of broadcasting 
rights in ART’s hands eliminated price competition between TV 
channels, enabling ART to set prices at levels higher than would be 
possible in a competitive market.  ART’s pricing for World Cup 
broadcasts shows its unreasonableness and was a clear attempt to 
take advantage of its market power. 
 
 39 ART signed a multi-year contract for exclusive broadcasting rights of the World Cup 
games in 2010 and 2014, English Football League, and European Champions League, 
Saudi League, and Arab Champions League. Interview with Khaled Slaubi, supra note 8. 
 40 Morocco’s national TV public stations “[did] not have enough money to pay the 
required US $13 million in broadcast fees to ART.” Fears over TV Blackout, BBC 
SPORT, June 7, 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/ 
world_cup_2006/5055078.stm.  Algeria’s state-run television made several financial 
offers to ART, to no avail. Id.  ART “demanded that Egypt pay up to $5.2 million to relay 
the matches, a figure considered exorbitant.” Egyptians await World Cup fate, BBC 
SPORT, Jun. 8, 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/africa/ 
5060570.stm. 
 41 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2, 37 (2000); see Mohamed El Hedi Lahouel, Competition 
Laws in MENA: An Assessment of the Status Quo and the Relevance of a WTO 
Agreement 5 (Econ. Research Forum, Paper No. 2011, 2000), available at 
http://www.erf.org.eg/middle.php?file=paperresult&id=152. 
 42 See, e.g., The Competition Law, No. 33 art. 7 (2004) (Jordan) (creating exemptions 
for “exceptional circumstances, emergency situations or natural disasters”), available at 
http://www.mit.gov.jo/Default.aspx?tabid=428. 
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ART’s high fees could be proof of illegality and abuse.43  Arab 
antitrust laws expressly prohibit this practice.44  Conclusions of 
excessive prices involving ART may be reached on the basis of 
several criteria, which are relevant to the facts of the case.45  
ART’s fees were closer to a monopolist’s fees rather than marginal 
cost.46  ART’s fees were due in part to restrictive agreements, not 
because ART was able to offer the best products or services. 
ART’s fees could have been more likely to be reasonable and 
lawful if they were discussed and genuinely negotiated with each 
of the Arab public television stations that would pay or bear the 
cost of the fees.  However, ART imposed its broadcasting fees on 
Arab public televisions without discussion.47  ART fees were 
unlikely to be lawful because they imposed single rates on 
everybody, rather than a series of rates adjusted to the 
circumstances of Arab countries. 
Some clubs and restaurants in countries, such as Jordan, opted 
to broadcast the World Cup live on one of many European 
channels broadcasting the event.  ART went out of its way to 
threaten those clubs and restaurants.  The reduction in the number 
of channels that broadcast the World Cup in Arab countries 
protects ART’s grant of exclusivity in the local markets, and 
enhances the value of the ART television contract by protecting the 
exclusivity of this contract from dilution caused by the importation 
of soccer matches from other foreign channels.  ART does not 
have the right to do so.  The antitrust laws of Arab countries 
 
 43 ART’s hefty fees could be attributed to high operating expenses, possibly due to lack 
of competition. 
 44 For example, the Kuwaiti antitrust law prohibits abusive use of a dominant position 
through excessive prices. Lahouel, supra note 41, at 6 n.2; see also BAHAA ALI EL-DEAN, 
PRIVATISATION AND THE CREATION OF A MARKET-BASED LEGAL SYSTEM: THE CASE OF 
EGYPT 167 (Brill Academic Publishers 2002) (Egyptian competition law forbids 
exploitative behavior such as charging monopoly prices). 
 45 Excessive prices are essentially prices which have no reasonable relationship to 
production costs. See Case C-242/95, GT-Link A/S v. De Danske Statsbaner (DSB), 1997 
E.C.R. I-04449. 
 46 Monopoly fee is the price at which the balancing of lower output and higher price 
maximizes profits.  Marginal cost is the extra or additional cost of producing another unit 
of output. See COLANDER, MACROECONOMICS 6–7, 35 (McGraw-Hill 2005). 
 47 See generally Fears over TV Blackout, supra note 40. 
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prohibit unreasonable ART behavior that restricts or distorts the 
market.48 
In sum, ART has done more than exercise an inherent 
broadcasting right.  ART, when exploiting its intellectual property 
right, exceeded the limits of its legal content. ART abused a 
dominant position by obtaining or exercising intellectual property 
rights.  ART’s exclusive rights and practices are incompatible with 
the antitrust laws in Arab countries. ART’s fees were unfairly 
onerous and anticompetitive.  Sublicensing might have reduced the 
anticompetitive effects of ART’s exclusivity significantly.  
Overriding reasons relating to the public interest including 
consumer protection should have directed ART to charge 
broadcasting fees on a fair and reasonable basis.49  It is not 
desirable that ART would benefit from keeping a monopoly of 
broadcasting live World Cup matches nor should ART be free to 
refuse sublicensing to other Arab public televisions.  The public 
interest must be fully protected by making the widest number of 
World Cup matches available to Arab viewers. 
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
The current deregulatory trend in Arab countries means that 
growing pay television stations need sports programming.50  Pay 
television has just begun to proliferate and consume any sporting 
events it could get its hands on.  By the end of this decade, almost 
all sports such as basketball, soccer, and handball could be 
available exclusively on pay television in Arab countries. 
Given that the World Cup is of fundamental importance to 
free-to-air viewers in Arab countries and that a substantial number 
 
 48 See Jordan Provisional Anti-Trust Law, supra note 42. 
 49 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Comm. for Western Asia [ESCWA], 1998–1999 Report, 51, 
E/ESCWA/ED/1999/24 (July 2000) (company practices must be advantageous to the 
consumer, resulting in abundance, diversity, quality and low prices). 
 50 See Abdellatif Aloofy, What Makes Arabian Gulf Satellite TV Programs? A 
Comparative Analysis of the Volume, Origin, and Type of Program, in THE INFORMATION 
REVOLUTION AND THE ARAB WORLD: ITS IMPACT ON STATE AND SOCIETY 36 (The 
Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research 1998) (studying the implications for 
national development of global telecommunications trends and spread of direct-broadcast 
satellite television services in Arab countries). 
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of Arab viewers cannot access or afford ART’s fees, the measures 
appear necessary.  The form and extent of these measures can vary.  
However, the goal of these measures is to ensure that the free 
broadcast television system is preserved. 
For the sake of the public interest, Arab countries could 
mandate the television coverage of key soccer events, including the 
World Cup.  To cover the costs of these free telecasts, Arab 
broadcasters could receive a government grant and the right to sell 
advertising. 
In order to limit exclusivity, Arab countries could enact laws 
that restrict pay television licensees from acquiring the right to 
televise certain listed soccer events, unless a national free-to-air 
broadcaster also has the right to televise the event on its 
broadcasting service.  The governments of Arab countries could 
list soccer events, which televising should, in its opinion, be 
available free to the general public.  However, there must be 
conditions for listing any soccer event.  For example, the list 
should include soccer events of national significance to Arab 
viewers that have usually been televised by national television 
broadcasters.  The list should not operate retrospectively and 
should only restrict the future acquisition rights to those soccer 
events by pay television.  Moreover, the governments must take 
into account complex issues of social equity, broadcasting 
development, and competition policy. 
Arab countries could ascribe to every important soccer event 
both public and pay television coverage rights.  In other words, 
public television and pay television could hold both sets of 
coverage rights, but pay television rights should not be exclusive to 
those of public television.  Therefore, all important soccer events 
would have the potential to be carried on public television or pay 
television or both.  Public television and commercial television 
channels such as ART could agree on a list of soccer events that 
ART would not broadcast exclusively.  These soccer events could 
include the World Cup, Arab Champions League, and European 
Champions League.  These soccer events should not be purchased 
on an exclusive basis by pay television. 
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Laws in Arab countries should require pay television such as 
ART to reserve a percentage of the World Cup matches for free 
broadcast.  ART could have agreed on broadcasts of designated 
World Cup matches to the general public.  For example, the semi-
finals and the final match are the most popular matches.  These 
matches, which have always been available on over-the-air 
broadcast television without charge, should be viewed freely in 
Arab countries.  The broadcasting of these matches should not 
prohibit ART from offering sophisticated, value-added, advance-
paid broadcasts of the other matches. 
If any of the previous measures is adopted by Arab countries, 
they could prevent private broadcasters from investing in televising 
a soccer event because they will consider Arab public television 
stations as “free riders.”  The inability to televise major soccer 
events may hinder the emergence of new private broadcasters that 
could have contributed to the diversity and quality of content 
available to Arab viewers.  Therefore, Arab public television 
stations could extract cheap rights from ART, instead of paying 
full price, by entering into mutual agreements.  This solution 
would encourage Arab national television to contract with ART 
and individuals to buy legal smart cards at a reasonable price 
without having to pay a large sum. 
Arab countries should take measures to protect the right to 
information and ensure public access to public television coverage 
of soccer events of major societal importance.  However, at this 
stage, no proposed laws or regulations in Arab countries have been 
drafted to address the issue of exclusive broadcasting based on 
ART’s case.51  Arab countries should legislate to limit exclusivity 
of broadcasting for policy reasons of equity. In addition, it is 
important for Arab countries to legislate in order to remedy the 
current legal uncertainty, avoid market distortions, and reconcile 
free circulation of television to protect the legitimate general 
 
 51 The U.S. and Australia do not have laws that restrain sports telecast on cable 
television.  Rather, the U.S. and Australia rely on regulatory monitoring such as the U.S. 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) monitoring. See IN RE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
SECTION 26 OF THE CABLE TV CONSUMER PROT. AND COMPETITION ACT OF 1992, 
9 F.C.C.R. 3440, 3474 (1994) (The FCC stated that it would continue to monitor the 
availability of sports.). 
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interest and broadcaster’s right of exclusive broadcasting rights 
that it has purchased to important soccer events. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Until recently, television, which originated as state-owned 
monopoly services, had been regarded less often as a business in 
Arab countries.  Television is seen as a public service and means 
of entertainment, but not as a business like any other business.  
Increasingly, however, contracts between Arab commercial 
broadcasters such as ART and organizers of soccer events such as 
FIFA, involving large sums of money, mean that important soccer 
events such as the World Cup will be encoded broadcasts.  Only 
subscribers who have signed contracts with ART can unscramble 
the encoded broadcast to view World Cup games live. 
ART emerged to capitalize on the rising popularity of the 
World Cup in Arab countries.  Furthermore, ART cares less about 
the World Cup than the revenue generated from such an event.  
ART’s exclusive right to broadcast live the 2006 World Cup 
matches raised many legal and social issues, the implications of 
which are not yet fully understood in Arab countries.  The 
broadcasting right given to ART was more analogous to a grant of 
monopoly than to recognition of copyright status.  Moreover, 
ART’s exclusive right extended and strengthened its dominant 
position and seemed contrary to antitrust laws in Arab countries.  
ART created power to shut competitors out of the television 
market and to force the public to pay high fees to subscribe. 
Broadcasting World Cup matches exclusively on commercial 
channels, as in the case of ART, is a real problem because of 
concerns for low-income, die-hard Arab fans at home.  The World 
Cup is a tradition that has always been available to all Arab 
viewers. Hence, access to it should not be determined by an 
income test.  In Arab countries where the rich get the best services 
and increasingly better information and the poor get increasingly 
marginalized, the enjoyment of the World Cup may become one of 
the distinguishing features of the “haves” and the “have-nots.” 
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In reaction to such legal and social concerns raised by ART 
exclusivity, Arab countries will have to take measures to ensure 
that major soccer events will be broadcast free-on-air, that is, they 
will not be encrypted. This is to ensure that the public need not 
subscribe to a particular channel to see an important soccer event 
of national or international interest.  The measures could include 
reserving a percentage of the World Cup matches for free 
broadcast or adopting laws that list important soccer events that 
cannot be made the subject of exclusive rights on commercial 
channels.  However, Arab countries should clearly adopt such 
measures to limit exclusivity of broadcasting with more thought to 
Arab viewers and at the same time should not stifle the future 
development of broadcasting soccer matches. 
Commercial channels obtaining the exclusive right to broadcast 
soccer matches are inevitable throughout Arab countries.  It 
therefore seems certain that the legal and social issues outlined in 
the ART case will no doubt arise again in other cases.  It follows 
that it would be wise to set up effective regulatory compliance 
committees in Arab countries to monitor the television market.  
Moreover, competition commissions in Arab countries should look 
at commercial channels’ practices in televising soccer events, 
especially exclusionary or exploitative practices.  No doubt there 
are also potential plaintiffs, such as consumer societies in Arab 
countries, who may file complaints.  One factor that could also 
keep ART and the like at bay is the pressure from Arab fans and 
members of parliaments. 
